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Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective
Abstract

Over the past thirty years, a significant amount of research from a variety of social science disciplines has
considered tax compliance. Economists, psychologists, and sociologists have contributed to the discussion,
offering research and, at times, conflicting explanations regarding whether a person is likely to comply with his
obligation to file an accurate tax return. The unifying theme among this research is a search for explanatory
reasons which are the factors that lead to non-compliance. In broad terms, the economic models of tax
compliance assume rational behavior, and that people will coldly consider compliance from the perspective as
to whether the expected utility of non-compliance exceeds the utility of complying. To that end, researchers
relying on the economic model have looked to a variety of independent variables likely to affect the calculus,
including penalty rates, the likelihood of an audit, and complexity. There are numerous studies testing the
variables that economists believe contribute to taxpayers’ decisions to comply with the tax laws. Psychologists
and sociologists have rightly pointed out that the economic model is insufficient as an explanatory tool.
Sociologists and psychologists alike argue that some economic models fail to capture the complexities of
human behavior and relationships, and fail to explain why compliance rates exceed what would otherwise be
expected if people were solely evaluating compliance in terms of dollars and cents. The challenge among
policymakers mining the social science research is that the research is at times inconsistent and incomplete.
This article considers how the current earned income tax credit (EITC} creates opportunities for individuals
to affirmatively misstate eligibility. It examines insights from the popular book Freakonomics and argues that
despite the confusing and sometimes inconsistent state of research relating to tax compliance, policymakers
concerned with reducing the tax gap should consider structural incentives and visibility as key factors relating
to the decision to intentionally comply with the tax laws. While more empirical research must be done that
examines and considers the relationship between various independent variables that may affect the decision to
comply with the tax laws, policymakers can limit opportunities for noncompliance by considering (i) how
taxpayers and return preparers perceive the visibility of their conduct, and (ii) how structural incentives of
particular provisions might contribute to the willingness to cheat. The article examines how structural
incentives and visibility operate in the context of the EITC, and create the conditions that allow individuals to
intentionally misstate eligibility on tax returns.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of approximately nine years, I had the opportunity
to talk with Janet Spragens at length about many topics. One topic
that took up a lot of our time was the earned income tax credit (the
“EITC”) and, in particular, the Internal Revenue Service’s (the “IRS”)
efforts to reduce the error rate associated with the EITC. Janet was
deeply concerned about low-income taxpayers, and she felt to her
core that IRS compliance efforts, if not designed or implemented
with the characteristics of the low-income taxpayer in mind, were
likely to be unduly burdensome and lead to erroneous
1
determinations. In testimony before the Oversight Board, in
∗

Professor of Law & Director, Federal Tax Clinic, Villanova University School of
Law. I am grateful for the research assistance of John Guinan and Jane Coogan, and
the Villanova University School of Law for its financial support of my research.
1. Janet Spragens’s testimony before the Oversight Board is essential reading
for those interested in issues affecting low-income taxpayers. See, e.g., Janet Spragens,
Professor of Law, Fed. Tax Clinic, Am. Univ., Wash. Coll. of Law, Statement Before
the IRS Oversight Board (Feb. 1, 2005), available at http://www.treas.gov/irsob/
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comments to the IRS, and in articles, Janet strove to give voice to the
low-income taxpayer, and she cautioned administrators and
legislators to consider policies from the taxpayer’s perspective. At
times, Janet was critical of efforts that she felt placed taxpayers at
greater risk, and she suggested a measured approach to proposals
like requiring the testing, registration, and certification of income tax
return preparers. Yet, Janet was not one just for the status quo, and
with that in mind, the inquiry about what to do with the problem of
non-compliance among low-income taxpayers, and the EITC in
particular, is a topic that I feel is especially appropriate to consider.
I. SUMO, BAGELS AND TAX CHEATING
The EITC error rate is high relative to other transfer programs,
though not as large in relative terms as other systemic areas of non4
compliance within the tax system.
Views differ on just how
important the EITC compliance problem is and the means to reduce
5
this error rate. This Article argues that applying insights from the
6
entertaining book Freakonomics can assist policymakers grappling with
the thorny issues of EITC non-compliance. In Freakonomics, using
Steven D. Levitt’s insights as a curious economist, the authors sift
through data to address broader issues of greater import. One key
meetings/2-01-05/statement_spragens.pdf (discussing how Low-Income Taxpayer
Clinics provide a critical service to the IRS by both educating taxpayers about their
tax obligations and by protecting the rights of low-income taxpayers).
2. See, e.g., Janet Spragens, Nancy Abramowitz & Leslie Book, Professors Comment
on EITC Precertification, 100 TAX NOTES 847, 848 (2003) (raising concerns over the
IRS’s proposed pre-certification program, which could increase compliance burdens
for low-income taxpayers and in turn deter a significant number from claiming the
EITC that Congress intended for them).
3. See, e.g., Janet Spragens & Nancy Abramowitz, Low-Income Taxpayers and the
Modernized IRS: A View From the Trenches, 107 TAX NOTES 1407, 1407 (2005) (asserting
that although the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 generates significant
efficiency gains for the agency, those gains often compromise fair process for lowincome taxpayers); Janet Spragens & Nancy Abramowitz, IRS Modernization and LowIncome Taxpayers, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 701, 701 (2001) (explaining that the IRS
reorganization has the potential to greatly benefit low-income taxpayers, but special
attention is required to ensure that the unique needs of this group are addressed);
Janet Spragens & Nina Olson, Tax Clinics: The New Face of Legal Services, 88 TAX NOTES
1525, 1529 (2000) (arguing that the professional tax community needs to recognize
the compliance problems that face low-income taxpayers and affirmatively support a
moratorium on annual tax changes).
4. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1882-84 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Nina Olson & Janet Spragens, Point & Counterpoint: Certification and
Precertification for the Earned Income Tax Credit, A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION NEWS Q.,
Summer 2005, at 10, 10-13, 20 (capturing different views on the merits of the IRS’s
proposal to require certain EITC claimants to pre-certify eligibility).
6. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (rev. and expanded ed. 2006) (2005).
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question they tackle is just how corrupt people are in different
settings, looking at, for example, the role incentives play for school
7
teachers who feed answers to students on tests, and parents of
children at day care centers who fail to pick their children up on
8
time.
In these scenarios, the authors examine how structural
incentives create great temptations and lead teachers and parents to
9
attempt to game the system by feeding students answers to tests, or
10
failing to discourage parents to pick their children up on time.
Two of Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner’s examples stand out as
illustrations of why there may be a non-compliance problem among
EITC-claiming taxpayers. The first story considers sumo wrestlers. In
sumo wrestling, wrestlers compete in fifteen matches to stay in the
top leagues, and those who finish with a winning record qualify for
11
larger pay and other benefits. The authors study the outcomes of
matches between those who are 7-7 and those who are 8-6, and note
that in these matches, which do not mean anything for the 8-6
wrestlers, but do mean a great deal in terms of cash for the wrestlers
with the poorer record, the 7-7 wrestler actually wins around 80% of
12
the time. According to the authors, the 7-7 wrestler should win less
13
than 50% of the time, and in matches where the outcome is not
crucial, the wrestlers with 7-7 records win only about 40% of the
14
time. To the authors, this suggests collusion among the wrestlers,
with the structure of sumo greatly contributing to the propensity for
15
the wrestlers to game the system.
Levitt and Dubner also examine Paul Feldman, a former economist
turned small businessman in the Washington, D.C. area, whose

7. See id. at 22 (noting that high-stakes testing has radically changed the
incentives for teachers to cheat since schools are now increasingly being held
accountable for poor test results).
8. See id. at 19 (explaining that when a three dollar late fee was imposed on
parents arriving to the day care center more than ten minutes late, the number of
late pickups actually increased because the amount of the fine was too small).
9. See id. at 22-23 (listing the various incentives that persuade teachers to cheat,
including the fact that “teacher cheating is rarely looked for, hardly ever detected,
and just about never punished”).
10. See id. at 19 (arguing that a three dollar late fee does not deter late pickups
because, among other things, it substitutes an economic incentive for a moral one).
11. See id. at 36 (maintaining that a sumo wrestler’s ranking affects every facet of
his life, including how much money he makes and how large of an entourage he
carries).
12. Id. at 37.
13. Id. at 38.
14. Id. at 39.
15. See id. (concluding that quid pro quo agreements among the wrestlers are the
most logical explanation for why 7-7 wrestlers win such an unnaturally high
percentage of matches against 8-6 opponents).
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business is remarkably efficient and profitable.
His business is
simple: early in the morning, he delivers bagels and a plywood box
17
with an opening for coins and bills to a company’s snack room.
18
Later, he returns and collects the cash box and any leftovers. The
business provided Feldman (and Levitt and Dubner) with an
interesting window into customers’ honesty. After tweaking the cash
collection mechanism to limit the temptation to steal (initially
Feldman relied on an open basket and coffee can with a plastic lid),
19
he noted that the overall payment rate for bagels was about 89%.
Attempting to draw conclusions from the data, bagel whiz Feldman
20
recounted Plato’s tale of “The Ring of Gyges,” from The Republic. In
the tale, a student of Socrates named Glaucon tells of a shepherd
named Gyges who comes upon a secret cavern with a corpse inside
21
that wore a golden ring. Taking the ring, Gyges discovered that
22
turning the ring permitted Gyges to become visible or invisible.
Able to escape detection, Gyges went on to commit horrible acts,
such as seducing the Queen, murdering the King, and seizing the
23
throne.
Glaucon’s telling of the tale was cautionary; is it so, as
Glaucon stated, that invisibility defeats virtue, leading to evil deeds?:
Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put
on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined
to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No
man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could
safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and
lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom
he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the
actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would
both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm
to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he
thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity,
for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is
24
unjust.

16. Id. at 41-47.
17. Id. at 42.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 44-45 (discussing that subsequent to 9/11, overall payment rate
inched up 2%, which, according to Feldman, reflected either patriotism or an
increase in a general sense of empathy).
20. Id. at 46.
21. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 56 (Benjamin Jowett trans., The World Publishing Co.
1946).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Like Gyges, those scarfing down Feldman’s bagels for free or less
than full price have the benefit of invisibility. Surely, installing video
cameras or paying an employee to serve as a bagel cashier would
reduce the possibility of invisibility, and hence increase the payment
rate. Those solutions, however, create other problems, including
adding technology and labor costs, thus cutting profits, especially if
the technology or labor costs exceed the underpayment costs.
Feldman considered companies with payment rates above 90% as
honest, and when rates were between 80% and 90% he found them
25
“annoying but tolerable.”
Levitt and Dubner, harkening Adam
Smith, who described humankind’s innate honesty, look to the nearly
90% of those paying for bagels as evidence that people are not
26
universally corrupt.
Levitt and Dubner’s insights suggest that policymakers concerned
with cheating should pay closer attention to structural incentives and
the relative ease in which individuals’ non-compliance falls outside
the light of day. Like Feldman’s bagel business, the tax system
provides a window on the propensity to cheat. Many academics and
economists have noted that incentives alone do not describe why
27
people choose to comply or not comply with the tax law, where the
overall compliance rate is probably somewhere between 80% and
28
85%. Yet, the possibility of detection and visibility are significant
factors in tax compliance. Not surprisingly, when there is extensive
information reporting to the IRS, as in wage income, people report
29
their income properly, with a compliance rate of 96%. Where there
is little information reported, people fail to report their income, such
as income attributable to sole proprietorships, where the compliance
30
rate is about 40%.
Taxpayer use of offshore credit cards and
25. LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 6, at 43.
26. See id. at 46 (“[A] lot of people steal from [Feldman], but the vast majority,
even though no one is watching over them, do not.”).
27. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN.
L. REV. 971, 973-74 (2003) (discussing the reasons why enforcement alone does not
explain the overall rate of tax compliance and noting how scholars have looked to
factors such as taxpayer morale, trust in government, and the use of tax compliance
as a signal to explain compliance rates that exceed what would be expected if
taxpayers were responsive only to audit rates and penalties).
28. See id. at 973 (reporting that the overall voluntary compliance rate is
generally estimated at 83%).
29. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 395 (2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/section_2.pdf.
30. See, e.g., The Tax Gap: Written Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Fin. Subcomm. on
Taxation and IRS Oversight on the Tax Gap, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Mark J.
Mazur, Director of Research, Analysis, and Statistics, Internal Revenue Service),
available at http://www.sentate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/
07260.pdf (stating that individual income tax underreporting accounted for 57% of
the overall tax gap in 2001, totaling $197 billion).
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complex trusts is like the turning of Gyges’s ring, cloaking the
taxpayer from the often distracted and overwrought eyes of the IRS.
A number of recent tax compliance changes and proposals reflect
the strong desire in tax administration to limit opportunities for
taxpayers to evade detection. These changes and proposals include:
31
disclosure rules pertaining to corporate tax shelters, proposals to
require financial institutions to track and report the basis of
32
securities, and third-party information reporting of miscellaneous
33
payments to corporations with fewer than fifty shareholders. Given
that budget deficits often coincide with a renewed emphasis on
34
reducing the tax gap, former Commissioner Everson’s priority for
35
renewed IRS enforcement, and a limited congressional appetite for
36
increasing IRS spending on enforcement, it is no surprise that
calibrating efforts to best reduce the tax gap has become an
increasingly important issue. Over the past few years, the IRS, in
31. I.R.C. § 6111(d) (2000) (amended 2004) (requiring registration of
confidential corporate tax shelters).
32. See, e.g., Joseph Dodge & Jay Soled, Reporting Tax Basis: Dawn of a New Era,
110 TAX NOTES 784, 784 (2006) (arguing that brokers should be required to report
the tax basis of their investments in addition to their existing obligation to report the
amount realized upon the sale or disposition of an investment).
33. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 29, at 394-96 (explaining that when
third-parties have to report information to the IRS, taxpayers report 96% of their
income).
34. For example, Congress is looking at the tax gap as a means of addressing the
current budget deficit. See Heidi Glenn & Meg Shreve, Lawmakers Begin Hunt for
Revenue to Solve Long-Term Fiscal Gap, 114 TAX NOTES 496, 496 (2007) (“When Senate
Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad, D-N.D., pressed a panel of witnesses last
week to address ways to change the tax code in light of the nation’s looming revenue
challenges, he said he was pointing to a key step toward solving the nation’s fiscal
problems.”). For historical precedent, see James W. Wetzler, Commentary, Alan
Plumley & C. Eugene Steuerle, Ultimate Objectives for the IRS: Balancing Revenue and
Service, THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 311, 343 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2004), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1000636_IRS_
objectives.pdf:
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) initiated a
period in which policymakers became willing to impose greater burdens on
taxpayers in order to harvest the revenues from improved tax compliance.
Faced with the need to restore fiscal stability after what they perceived as the
excessive 1981 tax cuts, . . . drafters of TEFRA reviewed numerous potential
ways to raise revenue and concluded that improved tax compliance was a
relatively attractive option.
35. IRS enforcement statistics have increased in the most recent fiscal year. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, GAO-07-136,
FINANCIAL AUDIT: IRS’S FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2005 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 35 (2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07136.pdf; see Robert Guy Matthews, InHouse Critic Holds IRS Feet to the Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2006, at A4 (noting how IRS
Commissioner Everson has emphasized enforcement and has “something of a toughguy reputation”).
36. See Martin A. Sullivan, Closing the Tax Gap: One Step Forward, Two Back, 110
TAX NOTES 691, 692 (2006) (deeming restrictions on IRS spending “ludicrous,” as
increased IRS spending could actually reduce a fiscal deficit).
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words and action, has paid increasing attention to larger ticket tax
37
issues, such as tax abuses related to the corporate use of tax shelters.
Yet, despite an increased emphasis on wealthier and corporate
taxpayers, it is also not surprising that among areas of the tax gap, the
IRS disproportionately directs scarce compliance resources on those
with less voice in the system: namely, the working poor who claim the
38
EITC.
Some of the IRS’s efforts have been particularly harsh,
including freezing, without providing notice, nearly 1.6 million lowincome taxpayers’ refunds over a four-year period under the IRS’s
39
“Questionable Refund Program.”
Given that the IRS’s compliance efforts are at times overbroad and
40
may deter or discourage eligible taxpayers, policymakers should
consider administrative or legislative changes that, on an ex ante
basis, decrease the incentives or opportunities for potentially
noncompliant EITC claimants. It is not a terrific stretch to make the
analogy between delivering an EITC-generated refund through a selfidentifying tax return and delivering bagels in a snack room with an
41
unattended cash box.
Unlike other benefits programs with
42
extensive and almost universal pre-eligibility screening tests, to
receive the EITC, taxpayers complete and file a tax return, and unless
the taxpayer is one of the roughly 2% audited, the low-wage worker
43
receives a benefit of up to $4,536 without consideration of eligibility.

37. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 35, at 35 (“The IRS has and will
continue to enforce the law across all sectors, but is focusing on corrosive activities of
corporations, high income taxpayers, and other major violators of the tax code.”).
38. See Zelenak, supra note 4, at 1884-87 (discussing how the IRS moderately overweights enforcement of the EITC relative to other parts of the tax gap). In effect,
the IRS’s increasing use of math error procedures, and its reliance on external and
internal databases to detect likely noncompliant taxpayers for audit selection reflects
this desire to detect likely intentional noncompliant taxpayers with fewer agency
resources allocated to the task. Increased agency mining of external data is also a
development in other benefits programs. See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and
the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare
Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 709 (2005) (discussing the use of
computer matching as primary verification in the Medicaid program).
39. David Cay Johnston, IRS Move Said to Hurt the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006,
at C1.
40. See Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net,
81 OR. L. REV. 351, 391 (2002) (describing these eligible taxpayers’ sense of defeat,
despite the option of challenging the IRS’s denial of their eligibility in court).
41. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 6, at 45-48 (detailing the design of this bagel
business and its rate of success).
42. See Mulzer, supra note 38, at 663-65 (discussing the role of eligibility
restrictions, benefit levels, and application procedures for means-tested social welfare
programs).
43. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 596:
EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf
[hereinafter IRS 596] (providing guidance for taxpayers on how to apply for Earned
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In other programs, like food stamps, error rates are tolerable, with
45
The most recent
over-payments hovering at or below 5%.
comprehensive study indicates that following IRS compliance efforts,
approximately 27% to 32% of the EITC dollars still were claimed
46
erroneously.
The EITC’s error rate, especially in comparison to
other benefits programs, has contributed to legislative and executive
47
branch scrutiny. The EITC error rate raises questions about the
viability of continued broad support, and has contributed to a variety
of conventional and unorthodox approaches to bring the error rate
48
down.
The difference in error rates between traditional benefits programs
and the EITC relates to the tax system’s reliance on self-declared
eligibility, which results in significantly lower administrative costs but

Income Credit tax benefits); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, EITC
THRESHOLDS AND TAX LAW UPDATES, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=
150513,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) [hereinafter IRS THRESHOLDS] (listing
maximum benefits for taxpayers in tax years 2005, 2006, and 2007).
44. For a discussion of changes to the administration of the food stamp program,
including efforts to target incorrect claimants, see David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare”
Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1377 (2004) (discussing that in some states a third or more of
food stamp applicants and recipients are investigated for fraud, even if the state does
not have probable cause to believe that an applicant or recipient participated in any
wrongdoing). More traditional benefits programs have intrusive and detailed
verification procedures, including home visits and the direct contacting of thirdparty witnesses. Id. at 1376-77.
45. See Dorothy Rosenbaum, Food Stamp Error Rates Hold at Record Low Levels in
2005, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, July 11, 2006, http://www.cbpp.org/630-04fa.htm (detailing overall trends in food stamp error rates and their implications
and possible causes).
46. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, EITC REFORM INITIATIVE
(2003), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110296,00.html. In Fiscal Year
2006, taxpayers claimed approximately $41 billion in EITC, with approximately $36
billion of that refunded; recent IRS estimates are that between 23% and 28% of the
$36 billion in refunded EITC was improper. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 35, at 134-35.
47. See Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-300, 116
Stat. 2350 (2002) (requiring federal agencies, including the IRS, to review programs
that are susceptible to improper payments). Professor Zelenak is critical of how the
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) has only requested from the IRS
improper payment information relating to the EITC: “Despite the rather obvious
application of the Act to improper refunds, the only program administered by the
IRS for which the OMB has requested improper payment information is the EITC.”
Zelenak, supra note 4, at 1897. For a highly critical appraisal of congressional and
administrative attention to lower-income non-compliance rather than noncompliance associated with higher-income taxpayers, see Dorothy Brown, The Tax
Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 785-86 (2005).
48. Cf. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare By Any Other Name: How We Can Save the EIC,
114 TAX NOTES 955 (2007) (suggesting that the EITC is on much firmer ground than
in prior periods and that some advocates’ suggestions that its compliance problems
could lead to its repeal are overstated).
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49

is much more susceptible to program error. In a recent Article, I
looked at the non-compliance problem among low-income
50
taxpayers, and argued that a component of the government’s efforts
to reduce those error rates should be a strengthening of third-party
due diligence requirements, including a possible tiered level of
gathering and reporting information to the IRS that would vary based
upon the experience of the return preparer and the number of tax
51
returns prepared.
Underlying my suggestions was both an
awareness that tax return preparers play an important role in the
EITC and a desire to increase compliance by addressing ways to shine
light on preparers and taxpayers, without materially increasing either
direct or indirect taxpayer costs. In this Article, I make two claims.
First, the current structure of the EITC presents structural incentives
to certain classes of taxpayers willing to misstate eligibility for the
EITC or facilitate others’ misstatements. These classes include
taxpayers with more than two children and non-custodial fathers who
maintain some connection to their children, but who fail to meet the
Internal Revenue Code’s (the “Code”) residency requirement for
EITC eligibility. Second, the relative invisibility of the tax return
filing process, and, in particular, the identification of children that
the taxpayer claims as qualifying children, emboldens taxpayers to
erroneously claim children who do not meet the Code’s detailed
eligibility requirements, and the residency requirement in particular.
After considering these two claims, I suggest prescriptive policies that
Congress and the IRS should consider to: (1) minimize the
structural incentives to cheat, and (2) increase the likelihood of
exposure, which provides a powerful ex ante deterrent effect on
misstating eligibility.

II. THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Before considering the EITC, it is helpful to place the discussion of
EITC compliance in the context of the considerable research
regarding tax compliance in general. Over the past thirty years, a
significant amount of research from a variety of social science
49. See Zelenak, supra note 4, at 1881 (noting the apparent inverse relationship
between congressional tolerance for program error and the ratio of administrative
costs to program benefits).
50. See Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the
Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2006) (lamenting
the lack of data for comparing rates of intentional non-compliance with
unintentional error leading to EITC non-compliance).
51. Id. at 1146-48.
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52

disciplines has considered tax compliance.
Economists,
psychologists, and sociologists have contributed to the discussion,
offering research and, at times, conflicting explanations regarding
the dependent variable of whether a person is likely to comply with
53
his obligation to file an accurate tax return. In the jargon of social
science research, the unifying theme among this research is a search
for explanatory reasons, referred to as independent variables, which
are the factors that lead to non-compliance. The disciplines’
approaches to research reflect differing views of how and why the
variables might be related and the various disciplines’ choices of
which variables to focus on indicate, in part, their assumptions about
what motivates human behavior.
In broad terms, the economic models of tax compliance assume
rational behavior, and that people will coldly consider compliance
from the perspective as to whether the expected utility of noncompliance exceeds the utility of complying.
To that end,
researchers relying on the economic model have looked to a variety
of independent variables likely to affect the calculus, including
penalty rates, the likelihood of an audit, and complexity. This
research has become quite sophisticated. There are numerous
studies testing the variables that economists believe contribute to
taxpayers’ decisions to comply with the tax laws. Psychologists and
sociologists have rightly pointed out that the economic model is
insufficient as an explanatory tool. Sociologists and psychologists
alike argue that framing a taxpayer as an amoral utility maximizer
fails to capture the complexities of human behavior and
relationships, and fails to explain why compliance rates exceed what
would otherwise be expected if people were solely evaluating
54
compliance in terms of dollars and cents. Accordingly, psychologists
have emphasized factors influencing the decision not to comply as
related to individuals’ moral aversion or acceptance of tax evasion,
52. Lin Mei Tan & Adrian Sawyer, A Synopsis of Taxpayer Compliance Studies:
Overseas vis-a-vis New Zealand, 9 NEW ZEALAND J. TAX’N L. & POL’Y 431, 433-37 (2003)
(providing an overview of research into factors affecting tax compliance).
53. I am indebted to the excellent theoretical overview of the respective social
science approach to tax compliance research in Neil Brooks, Challenge of Tax
Compliance, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 7, 19 (Chris
Evans & Abe Greenbaum eds., 1998). For a good survey of the tax compliance
literature, see Pauline Niemirowski, Steve Baldwin & Alex Wearing, Thirty Years of Tax
Compliance Research: Of What Value Is It to the ATO?, TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 199, 211-12 (Michael Walpole & Chris Evans eds., 2001).
54. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Symposium Norms & Corporate
Law: Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1725 (2001)
(pointing to lawyers who become judges and high rates of tax compliance as
examples of human behavior beyond mere self-interest).
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with sociologists examining factors like attitudes toward government
generally, distributional and procedural fairness of the tax system,
55
The challenge
and demographical variances among taxpayers.
among policymakers mining the social science research is that the
research is at times inconsistent and incomplete.
As Professor Brooks aptly summarizes, in a perfect or even merely
orderly world the research would lead to:
[A] theory about why people comply with the tax law from which
an interested tax administration department could deduce a
comprehensive compliance strategy. Naturally, no such theory has
emerged from the research. Like much empirical research, we end
up learning how much we do not know. In some of the research, it
is difficult to be sure which way causation runs[,] . . . in more
controlled experiments conducted to test for causation there are
problems generalizing the results . . . and theories based on some
research have become so complex that they explain everything, by
56
tautology.

A survey of the quantitative tax compliance literature is a sobering
57
exercise. The tax compliance literature is often lacking the sweep of
context, a true understanding of patterns of human behavior. To
date, the quantitative approach to tax compliance has failed to offer
satisfactory predictive generalizations. One perceptive commentator,
Margaret McKerchar, in addressing the shortfalls in the compliance
literature, noted that research has:
[B]een driven by the need to find one model that fitted [sic]
(rather than explained) all possible types of compliance behaviour
and allowed predictions to be made about the taxpaying
population in general. In doing so, assumptions . . . were often
unrealistic and therefore reduced the usefulness of the model to
policymakers and administrators. For example, it is unlikely that
taxpayers are all utility maximisers, risk averse or rational
decisionmakers. . . . [P]eople exist in a dynamic environment
where there are a great deal of influences, of which some are

55. Brooks, supra note 53, at 20.
56. Id. at 21-22.
57. See Niemirowski et al., supra note 53, at 211-12 (identifying sixty-four variables
for non-compliance, and bemoaning the contradictory and inconclusive research).
“Beliefs, personality traits, demographic variables and tax rates, opportunity,
propensity to evade, and various ‘external variables’ have also contributed to
understanding compliance behaviour. Yet despite the extensive research, there is
still a paucity of consistent reliable predictors or explanations of causality.” Id. at
211.
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inconstant and others may have not yet been identified or studied
58
by researchers.

Facing the inadequacy and shortfalls of the existing compliance
literature, Professor McKerchar noted that researchers and
policymakers would be better served by abandoning the search for a
“single model of taxpayer compliance and consider[ing] the use of
different models to explain differing types of compliance
59
behaviour.”
McKerchar continued by noting the importance of
60
identifying the various typologies of non-compliance, and urged that
additional studies relate to actual observed taxpayer behavior and
61
focus group study.
Faced with the at times inconsistent findings, Professor Brooks
suggested that more research is needed, but in the meantime,
policymakers should focus on the rather straightforward strategy of
62
reducing opportunities for evasion. This is consistent with Levitt
and Dubner’s approach of examining structural incentives and
visibility, two key factors that can contribute to the temptation to
cheat. What follows in the next two Sections is a consideration of
how the current EITC creates opportunities for individuals to
affirmatively misstate eligibility. Lest advocates think this paints an
unfair picture of low-income taxpayers as cheaters, I am intimately
58. Margaret McKerchar, Why Do Taxpayers Comply? Past Lessons and Future
Directions in Developing a Model of Compliance Behaviour, TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE
21ST CENTURY 225, 242 (Michael Walpole & Chris Evans eds., 2001).
59. Id.
60. See id. at 243 (emphasizing the need for further research on tax compliance).
I began this project of applying the useful Kidder/McEwen typology to low-income
taxpayers in The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV.
1145 (2003) [hereinafter Book, One Size Does Not Fit All], and continued it with a
focus on commercial tax return preparers in my article Preventing the Hybrid from
Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, supra note 50.
This Article continues that project; in future research, I hope to apply more
qualitative research models to help better explain how commercial tax return
preparers affect tax compliance among lower-income taxpayers.
61. McKerchar, supra note 58, at 243. An excellent example of a study that
considers taxpayer behavior is Joseph Bankman & Stewart Karlinsky, Developing a
Theory of Cash Businesses’ Tax Evasion Behaviour and the Role of Their Tax Preparers, 5TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMINISTRATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS 136, 167 (Michael Walpole & Rodney Fisher eds., 2002). Bankman
and Karlinsky interviewed hundreds of independent contractors, business owners
and tax preparers, all of whom spoke to the authors on conditions of confidentiality.
Id. at 136. Bankman and Karlinsky concluded that cash business owners primarily
rely on themselves to under-report income though they concluded that some cash
business taxpayers looked to their return preparer to facilitate the non-compliance.
Id. at 161-62. The qualitative approach that Bankman and Karlinsky deployed, rather
than a pure quantitative approach that focuses on causal relationships between
variables, is a valuable means of learning the dynamics of non-compliance, and I
believe offers the potential for generating significant insights for researchers and
policymakers.
62. Brooks, supra note 53, at 22.
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aware of some of the limitations of this Article’s approach. First, this
Article considers only a slice of the EITC compliance problem. As I
have indicated elsewhere, in considering the EITC compliance
challenge there are separate and often distinct compliance
63
problems.
Some of the non-compliance relating to the EITC is
facilitated and caused by the supply part of the equation; that is,
commercial preparers and other return preparers who play a key role
in the tax system generally and an even larger role for low-income
taxpayers. Likewise, preparers’ own incentives to sell low-income
taxpayers services and products that are monetized by the very
refunds that taxpayers claim on tax returns creates a strong
64
temptation for preparers to facilitate errors.
In addition, a
significant number of errors on the EITC relates to inadvertent errors
that taxpayers (or their preparers) themselves make. This Article
largely focuses on the taxpayer willing to intentionally misstate facts
on a tax return to ensure eligibility or enhance the amount of the
EITC claimed. A challenge for researchers is that there is little hard
data on the various motivations and reasons underlying the EITC
errors, and there is not an adequate understanding of the role that
65
commercial preparers themselves play. I do not wish to suggest that
63. See Book, One Size Does Not Fit All, supra note 60, at 1165-77 (listing eight
categories of non-compliance, including reasons related to the complexities of the
EITC rules and procedure, people’s varying attitudes toward the tax system, and
advice from tax professionals).
64. The role that preparers can play in brokering or facilitating noncompliance
is illustrated by the actions of certain Jackson Hewitt tax preparation franchises,
which the government alleged were pervasively engaged in fraudulent schemes to
erroneously claim the EITC and generally misstate tax liabilities. See DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT SUES JACKSON HEWITT TAX PREPARATION FRANCHISES IN
FOUR STATES, ALLEGING PERVASIVE FRAUD (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/
txdv07215.htm (the government filed civil injunction suits alleging that the franchise
operations filed thousands of false tax returns resulting in $70 million in losses to the
Treasury). I intend to explore the complex role that preparers play in tax
compliance in future research. For more on some of the challenges to compliance
associated with commercial return preparers, see Regulation of Federal Tax Return
Preparers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. 1-2 (2005) (written statement of Nina E. Olson, Nat’l Taxpayer
Advocate), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/testimony_wm_oversight_
returnpreparers.pdf (correlating the increase in electronic filing and availability of
ETIC funds with an increase in taxes being prepared by “unenrolled” preparers and
those for whom tax preparation is not the primary business).
65. See Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, THE
CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 148, 170 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004)
(arguing that the use of a variety of paid preparers makes it difficult to generalize
their impact, as a group, on tax compliance). Holtzblatt and McCubbin identify
EITC error rates among different classes of commercial preparers, though there
appears to be no meaningful data on the reasons why the error rates differ. Id. at
170-71. Explanations for the varied error rates include differing levels of respect for
the tax laws, technical knowledge of the law, and taxpayer characteristics among the
differing classes of preparers. Id.
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low-income taxpayers are less trustworthy as a class than other people,
nor even that a majority of the errors relating to the EITC stem from
claimants’ intentional willingness to misstate facts that enhance
eligibility or create the conditions for eligibility. Policymakers would
benefit from a more nuanced understanding of the root causes of the
problem. More research and a clearer understanding of the
underlying reasons for errors will assist in crafting administrative and
legislative responses. It is true that the varied nature of the problem
suggests that the government must rely on a multi-faceted approach
to compliance, which includes a healthy dose of quality taxpayer
service. This Article is not a blanket condemnation of the EITC
errors as all intentional and driven by claimant conduct. Yet, a
realistic discussion of the issue must take into account that in the tax
system generally, and with the EITC in particular, there is ample
opportunity to misstate eligibility. Professor Brooks and Levitt and
Dubner suggested that intentional non-compliance follows
opportunity, and this insight is as relevant for the EITC claimants as it
was for corporate taxpayers who participated in complex corporate
66
tax shelters in the late 1990s and first part of this century.
III. STRUCTURAL INCENTIVES WITHIN THE EITC CREATE THE
MOTIVATION FOR INTENTIONAL SYMBOLIC NON-COMPLIANCE
On the demand side of the equation, I suspect that individuals
respond to perceived inequities in the current EITC, and act to
redress those inequities by claiming an EITC to which they are not
eligible. Working in a legal clinic representing low-income taxpayers
for the past nine years has provided me with numerous instances of
claimants feeling that the current system does not adequately reward
low wage workers who may be connected in some way to children
who fall short of the technical requirements of the qualifying child
67
definition.
This frustration with the EITC eligibility rules thus
contributes to symbolic non-compliance in effect, intentional noncompliance that taxpayers commit to address perceived injustices in
68
the system. Two common instances relate to: (1) taxpayers with
66. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 197-211
(2005) (discussing the rise of corporate tax shelters in the United States and
Australia).
67. A qualifying child is: (1) a son or daughter, or sibling, or is a stepchild or
eligible foster child of the taxpayer; and (2) has the same principal place of abode as
the taxpayer for more than half of the tax year; and (3) does not exceed certain age
requirements. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) (2000) (referring to § 152(c)). Lineal
descendants of children, stepchildren and siblings are also eligible to be considered
qualifying children. Id.
68. Book, One Size Does Not Fit All, supra note 60, at 1174.
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more than two qualifying children, and (2) non-custodial parents
(mostly fathers) who are connected to the minor children but who
69
fail the EITC’s technical residency requirements.
The current EITC is based upon the existence of earned income
70
and the residence of up to two qualifying children. The presence of
more than two qualifying children does not affect the amount of
71
EITC that can be received.
Consider that the poverty rate for
children in families with three or more children is 26%, compared to
72
12% for families with only one or two children. Poverty is more
prevalent among larger families, and the EITC’s effectiveness is
73
“poorly designed to address this pattern of child poverty.”
To
address this inequity, low wage workers with more than two children
are tempted to “share” the benefits with related parties who may have
74
earned income, but fewer than two qualifying children of their own.
75
Likewise, many non-custodial parents are still connected in some
material way to their biological children, but because the noncustodial parent fails the EITC’s residency requirement, he or she is
unable to claim the children as a qualifying child for purposes of the
EITC. One of our clients in the Villanova Federal Tax Clinic, for
69. Other situations also lend themselves to symbolic non-compliance. For
example, nontraditional family arrangements also present a real challenge, as there
are many unrelated wage earners who live with the child and the child’s parent, but
who may not be married to the parent due to laws preventing gay marriage or other
state benefits’ policies that penalize adults for marrying. For a discussion of some of
the challenges that alternative families face in the tax system, and with the EITC in
particular, see Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 267, 282-84 (2002). I have previously discussed the unfairness of the
2000 legislative change that eliminated the ability for adults to treat children as
qualifying children unless the children are placed with the adult by an authorized
placement agency. Book, One Size Does Not Fit All, supra note 60, at 1184-86.
70. See IRS 596, supra note 43, at 1 (providing a summary of EIC requirements for
taxpayers to use as a reference).
71. See IRS THRESHOLDS, supra note 43 (listing maximum credit amounts for only
three scenarios: where the taxpayer has zero, one, or at least two qualifying
children).
72. JASON FURMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TAX REFORM AND
POVERTY 4 (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/4-10-06tax.pdf.
73. Id.
74. The other child-related provisions in the tax code, the dependency
exemption and child tax credit, are based on a per-child basis, though the value of
the dependency exemption is limited by its deductible rather than refundable
nature, and the child-tax credit is refundable only in a limited manner for lowerwage families with three or more children. Id. at 4-5. Increasing the refundable
nature of the child tax credit for lower-income individuals would likewise have a
significant effect on reducing the tax system’s incentives for sharing children. See
Brown, supra note 47, at 789 (2005) (noting the unfairness of the CTC’s limited
refundability for lower-income individuals).
75. By non-custodial, I mean parents who spend significant time with children
through shared or partial physical custody, but who do not spend more than half the
year with the child.
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example, recently had his EITC properly denied after audit when the
IRS properly determined that he was not the custodial parent. While
not the custodial parent, he did spend approximately three days per
week with his children, who lived the balance of the week with their
mother, and he was the children’s principal provider of material
support. Our client, a full-time low wage worker, claimed the
children as dependents, and the custodial mother signed a waiver
76
permitting the father to do so.
This is by no means a unique
situation.
It is possible, at some cost, to minimize the structural incentives to
cheat in the above situations. Providing some additional EITC
benefit for more than two children will reduce the systemic
temptations to cheat, and a number of observers have suggested this
77
solution on grounds other than its effect on compliance incentives.
To address the situation with non-custodial parents, the National
Taxpayer Advocate has suggested creating a separate credit for non78
custodial parents who pay all required child support in a given year.
This would likewise lessen the temptation for cooperative unmarried
or divorced parents to cheat when the custodial parent has no or
limited benefit from the EITC; in situations, for example, where she
has little or no earned income. The above proposed solutions are
within the framework of the existing EITC. In addition to the virtues
of the proposals within the framework of accepted policy objectives of
the EITC, including reducing the effects of childhood poverty and
79
perhaps providing proper labor incentives, they lessen the existing
structural incentive for individuals to borrow or lend children to
enhance their EITC eligibility.
There has been increasing attention to the possibility of a radical
overhaul and consolidation of the Code’s existing child benefits into
80
one unified refundable credit. While these proposals have other
76. I.R.C. § 152 allows for non-custodial parents to claim the children as
dependents, even if the non-custodial parent does not satisfy the residency
requirement under the dependency exemption. See Internal Revenue Service, Form
8332, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8332.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2007)
(allowing for the non-custodial parent in effect to transfer the child to the custodial
parent for purposes of the dependency exemption and child tax credit).
77. It may also address some of the negative effects that the EITC may have on
groups that have a higher incidence of larger families. See Brown, supra note 47, at
820 (noting that blacks are more likely than whites to have larger families and thus
are penalized for the EITC’s failure to increase benefits for families with more than
two qualifying children).
78. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 29, at 398.
79. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 72 (discussing the EITC’s
impact on poverty and labor participation).
80. These ideas appear to be gaining more traction. For recent proposals, see
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK (2006) (noting government
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81

merits beyond an effect on compliance, including considerations of
efficiency and fairness, an important consideration to such proposals
is the possibility that a revised and combined credit provision might
also limit the opportunity or lessen the motive for individuals to game
the system. This consideration is apparent in some recent proposals,
including the 2005 National Taxpayer Advocate Report that
recommends combining the dependency exemption, child tax credit,
and aspects of the EITC into a unified and refundable Family Credit
82
available to all taxpayers, regardless of income.
In her
recommendation, the National Taxpayer Advocate states that such a
structure will minimize the temptation for individuals to lend or
83
borrow children. One measure to evaluate such proposals and their
potential for creating the conditions for structural incentives is how
likely they are to provide benefits to individuals who have economic
or familial attachments to children, and whether the tax transfer
mechanism contributes to claimants acting like Japanese sumo
wrestlers looking to share prize money.
IV. VISIBILITY AND THE CLAIMING OF QUALIFYING CHILDREN
The importance of visibility and information reporting on
compliance is both intuitive and somewhat irrational. Individuals
overstate the likelihood of audit, and when they know that the IRS
has information pertaining to the treatment of an item on a tax
return, they are much less inclined to report something that is
inconsistent with information the IRS has already obtained.
According to Levitt and Dubner, visibility is a key factor in tax
compliance, and the wide divergence in income reporting among
those self-employed and those who earn wages from an employer is
attributable to the fact that those who are self-employed have much
more incentive to cheat because they know that barring an audit, the
IRS has no chance of knowing the self-employed individual’s true

influence on work behavior and suggesting alternative policies to create incentives
for citizens to work); President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair,
and Pro-Growth:
Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System (Nov. 1, 2005),
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report (suggesting ways to cut down on the
complexity of the tax code, including combining different tax provisions into one).
For a spirited defense of the use of refundable credits in the tax system, see Lily T.
Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The
Case for Refundable Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006).
81. See generally Batchelder, Goldberg, Jr. & Orszag, supra note 80.
82. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 29, at 371.
83. Id. at 405.
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income. Given the low audit rate, even with individuals generally
overstating the chances of audit, it is no wonder that many taxpayers
feel confident enough to underreport income. Given the political
challenges associated with giving the IRS additional resources to
85
reach more taxpayers (Levitt and Dubner remind us of the
popularity of Michael Dukakis’ 1988 campaign promises to support a
86
more vigorous IRS), some taxpayers feel confident enough that they
can file incorrect tax returns and get away with underpaying what
87
they owe, at significant cost to those who pay their fair share.
In addition to the importance of visibility to the proper reporting
88
of income, it also is crucial for other aspects of tax compliance. In a
brief discussion of tax compliance, Levitt and Dubner describe how
the requirement for individuals to list the actual social security
number of any person claimed as a dependent resulted in a
89
substantial decrease in the number of claimed dependents. They
90
recount the efforts of IRS employee John Szilagyi, who had the idea
of requiring individuals to list their claimed dependents’ social
security numbers on their tax returns, resulting in a significant
decrease in the number of fictitious children claimed. The authors
estimate that there was an increase of tax revenue by about $3 billion
91
This approach was a low-cost way of limiting the
per year.
84. Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Filling in the Tax Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2006, at 26.
85. For a discussion of some of the political challenges associated with giving the
IRS additional resources to clamp down on tax cheating, see Ryan J. Donmoyer,
Democrats’ Revenue Plans Might Mean Turning Taxman Into ‘Beast’, BLOOMBERG.COM,
Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=
aU8SELY0OrWM (quoting former Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Pamela Olson, as saying that suggestions that the IRS
should collect a significant portion of the tax gap risk turning “the IRS into the
enforcer Congress ordered it not to be less than a decade ago”).
86. Dubner & Levitt, supra note 84.
87. Recent estimates peg the costs to those who are compliant at approximately
$2680 per household. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NINA E. OLSON, NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE IRS AND THE TAX GAP 1 (Feb. 16, 2007), http://budget.house.gov/hearings/
2007/08Olsontestimony.pdf.
88. For a discussion of the policy implications of requiring additional
information reporting in the tax system, as well as practical suggestions for situations
that warrant additional reporting, see id. at 4-6.
89. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 6, at 21 (noting that as a result of the IRS
requiring social security numbers for dependents, seven million less children were
claimed on tax returns).
90. The story of Szilagyi is also told in Filling in the Tax Gap, Dubner & Levitt,
supra note 84.
91. LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 6, at 239; cf. Ariel Rubinstein, Freak-Freakonomics,
3 The Economists’ Voice Issue 9, Article 7, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/art7
(critiquing the magnitude of the effect of requiring taxpayers to list claimed
dependents’ social security numbers)
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opportunity for taxpayers to twist the ring or throw an invisibility
92
cloak around claimed tax benefits.
Many observers have noted that the tax system’s relative impersonal
approach to claiming benefits, especially in comparison to the
detailed and often in-person pre-benefits eligibility process of other
benefits programs, contributes to the higher error rates relative to
93
these other programs. While EITC claimants (like other taxpayers)
have the possibility of income misreporting (though EITC-claiming
taxpayers may have an incentive to overstate or create earned
income), the residence of qualifying children is the most common
94
EITC error, and within that category, the residency requirement is
95
the most common error. Unlike wage income, there is no thirdparty information reporting requirement that would identify children
96
and addresses of record.
Other agencies responsible for
administering benefits programs where eligibility is dependent upon
residency requirements have relied on fairly intrusive measures to
establish eligibility, including pre-eligibility third-party contacts and
97
visits to homes.
In some ways, the IRS’s pilot pre-certification

92. The concept of visibility’s effect on tax compliance has been previously
explored. See Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, 2
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 76 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (concluding
that the “visibility” of income reporting violations by citizens determines the extent
to which citizens comply with the laws); see also Leandra Lederman, The Interplay
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1500 (2003)
(noting that the high compliance among those whose income is reported and
identifying lack of opportunity as a key factor in the high compliance rate).
93. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 4, at 1876-79 (comparing the EITC program,
which operates on the basis of self-declared eligibility, to food stamp programs or
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, where claimants must complete a
government required process to establish eligibility).
94. Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 65.
95. Id. at 164-66.
96. While there are no information reporting obligations relating to residency,
the IRS does have access to data collected by the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) that relates to child support payments, and its computer system,
known as the Dependent Database, incorporates data acquired from HHS into the
processing of individual tax returns. This process helps guide the selection of
returns for examination. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE
SELECTION OF EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT RETURNS FOR EXAMINATION CAN BE
IMPROVED
TO
FURTHER
PREVENT
ERRONEOUS
PAYMENTS
(2003),
http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2004reports/200440004fr.html
(reviewing the IRS’s process of selecting EITC cases for examination using a costbenefit analysis and making recommendations to provide for a more productive
combination of returns for examination). Other benefits programs have increasingly
relied on data mining to assist in verification and compliance activities. See Mulzer,
supra note 38, at 709 (discussing the use of data mining in the Medicaid program).
97. In the food stamp context, see David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution:
Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1271, 1377 (2004) (arguing that individuals will be less apt to take advantage of
food stamp benefit programs if doing so would increase their risk of fraud charges).
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98

program,
which required certain taxpayers to provide
documentation establishing a claimed qualifying child’s residence at
or before the filing of a tax return, was an effort to bring children
outside of the shadows and impose on claimants, rather than third
parties directly, the obligation of reporting relevant information to
99
the IRS.
At present, the IRS does not plan to implement certification on a
wide scale, though the IRS is continuing to evaluate certification’s
100
effect on participation and the level of erroneous payments. Under
current practice, how visible are the qualifying children that EITCclaimants list? It is worth recalling that approximately 70% of
101
taxpayers claiming the EITC use paid preparers.
The claiming of
the EITC is a rather impersonal and invisible process, especially given
that many taxpayers who are willing to misstate information on a
return have the benefit of blaming another party (the return
preparer) if the IRS does catch up with them. Given that there are
often cultural and language barriers between the preparer and the
102
taxpayer, even assuming good faith and competence, there may be
legitimate reasons why a return claiming the EITC lists a child who
103
did not in fact live with the taxpayer for more than six months.
Paid preparers do have a due diligence obligation that requires
them to complete and retain a due diligence worksheet detailing the
104
preparer’s efforts at obtaining appropriate information.
Current

98. For a discussion of the IRS EITC certification tests, see Internal Revenue
Service, Earned Income Certification Test, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/
0,,id=118200,00.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
99. Preliminary results from the IRS’s testing indicated that it likely deterred
non-compliant taxpayers from claiming the EITC; however, unlike merely listing a
social security number on a return, it did also increase the costs for those who were
eligible and also likely deterred some eligible taxpayers from actually claiming the
credit. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY & INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC) INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2005),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/irs_earned_income_tax_credit_initiative_final_report
_to_congress_october_2005.pdf.
100. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 35.
101. ALAN BERUBE, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW SAFETY NET: HOW THE TAX
CODE HELPED LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES DURING THE EARLY 2000S 9 (2006),
http://www.brook.edu/metro/pubs/eitc/20060209_newsafety.pdf.
102. See Michael I. O’Connor, Tax Preparation Services for Lower-Income Filers: A Glass
Half Full, or Half Empty?, 90 TAX NOTES 231, 232-37 (2001) (discussing some of the
cultural and language barriers between preparers and low–income taxpayers).
103. The residency requirement is relatively straightforward, though temporary
absences can be disregarded for purposes of determining eligibility, and shared
custody arrangements between parents can be complicating factors.
104. A preparer must complete Form 8867, Paid Preparer’s Earned Income Credit
Checklist, or an equivalent form. The completion of the checklist must be based on
information provided by the taxpayer or reasonably obtained by the preparer. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6695-2(b)(1) (2000).
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rules do not require the preparer to furnish the worksheet with the
return, though for all taxpayers claiming an EITC (except those
claiming the relatively small childless EITC), the return must also
105
include a Schedule EIC. Schedule EIC is a one-page sheet requiring
certain information about the qualifying child to appear on the
schedule, including the child’s name, social security number, year of
birth, relationship to the taxpayer, and the number of months that
the child lived with the taxpayer in the year in question. The
taxpayer is not required to separately sign Schedule EIC, though the
taxpayer is required to sign the appropriate 1040, which contains a
statement to the effect that under penalties of perjury the taxpayer
attests to the truth, correctness, and accuracy of the return and
106
accompanying schedules and statements.
Within the norms of the tax system, where can more be done to
shine more light on taxpayers claiming the EITC, without infringing
107
too far on legitimate privacy rights or imposing too great a cost on
taxpayers or third parties? I have previously argued that every paid
preparer should be required to sign the EITC due diligence
108
worksheet and submit a copy of that sheet to the IRS. To increase
the visibility of the process, preparers should also be required to
furnish a statement to individuals who claim the EITC with a
summary of the EITC claimed.
The statement should read
something to the effect of:
Based upon information you told me about [name[s]] age and
relationship to you, and that [name[s]] lived with you for more
than six months (or was temporarily absent from you), you claimed
[name[s]] as qualifying children for the earned income credit. As
required by law, I have furnished to the IRS a due diligence

105. Internal Revenue Service, Schedule EIC, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
f1040sei.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
106. For e-filed returns, the IRS has promulgated Form 8879, which the taxpayer
signs and the preparer retains for the later of three years from the filing of the
return or the return’s due date.
Internal Revenue Service, Form 8879,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8879.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
107. For a consideration of privacy rights in the context of tax compliance, see
Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1065 (2003)
(conceding that while preserving the confidentiality of taxpayer information usually
promotes compliance, some exceptions to this policy may be beneficial); see also
Cynthia Blum, The Flat Tax: A Panacea For Privacy Concerns?, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1241,
1257 (2005) (noting that while IRS reporting requirements may warrant privacy
concerns, a constitutional issue regarding these requirements would only come
about in the absence of security precautions or unwarranted disclosure of private
data).
108. See generally Book, supra note 50, at 1103 (discussing the EITC and the
problems in determining the reasons for taxpayer non-compliance).
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worksheet pertaining to the EITC and am submitting to you this
statement in accordance with requirements under law.

I suspect that individuals who know that preparers will separately
report information about claimed qualifying children will be less
inclined to misstate information on their tax return. It will be much
more difficult (though not impossible) for individuals to hide behind
preparer error when given a separate clearly marked disclosure
statement listing information relating to the EITC. While it is true
that the IRS could only detect errors relating to residence by
examining the tax return, I believe it would reduce the temptation to
cheat, akin to bagel whiz Feldman’s tinkering with the box where
money was collected and forcing claimants to take one more
affirmative step (receiving a clearly-delineated statement) before the
receipt of an EITC-generated refund.
Imposing additional reporting obligations on third parties will not,
however, have an effect on individuals who self-prepare their tax
returns. For those individuals, the IRS might require more selfdisclosure and vary the disclosure based upon certain variables,
including the type of relationship between the taxpayer and the
claimed child and whether the taxpayer has previously claimed the
qualifying child. For example, I suspect that married taxpayers who
file a joint return and claim their biological children as qualifying
children are much less likely to claim an improper child than a single
parent filing as a head of household or an uncle or aunt claiming a
niece or nephew. Likewise, the first claiming of a qualifying child
seems an opportune moment to require more information from a
taxpayer, especially given that the non-compliance can become
109
habitual.
To address the former situation, the IRS could
promulgate a different Schedule EIC that would require more
information to be disclosed (such as checking a box that would list
common circumstances why the child resided with the taxpayer in the
year in question), and perhaps even have a separate signature
requirement directly on the Schedule EIC itself. To deal with first
time claimants, the form should directly ask the taxpayer to disclose if
this is the first time that the taxpayer is claiming the individual as a
110
qualifying child, and, if so, explain why.
109. See Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A
Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Non-Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE
47, 62 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (explaining that habitual noncompliance develops over time as the taxpayer learns what one can “get away with”
based on previous filings).
110. For example, the form could identify common situations when a taxpayer
should claim a child, including the birth of a child, a formal custody arrangement,
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CONCLUSION
There is much we do not know about tax compliance generally and
compliance problems of low-income taxpayers. While research in tax
compliance is flourishing, there are many unanswered questions
relating to what contributes to the misreporting of income and
overstatement of deductions and credits. Structural incentives and
visibility are two factors that appear to have an effect on individuals’
willingness to misstate items on a tax return. In this Article, I argue
that policymakers should consider structural incentives and visibility
in fashioning responses to the EITC error rate. Perceived unfairness
with the current EITC, combined with the ease in which related
parties can share the claiming of children, is likely a factor in the
EITC overclaim rate. The opportunity for collusion, as Levitt and
Dubner illustrate with their discussion of sumo results, creates
temptation and contributes to EITC overclaims. Likewise, the
relative invisibility of the residence of qualifying children also creates
opportunities for individuals to misstate eligibility. Generating
additional disclosure requirements for commercial return preparers
and taxpayers themselves will temper the temptation to cheat. While
not a panacea for the multiple reasons why individuals may misstate
eligibility for the EITC, reducing the possibilities of collusion, as well
as increasing the exposure associated with claiming the EITC, will
serve the modest but important objective of reducing the perceived
and actual opportunities to misstate eligibility.

the first presence of sufficient earned income, etc. Increasing disclosure obligations
on taxpayers themselves has the risk of adding complexity, deterring eligible
individuals from claiming the EITC, or encouraging even greater use of commercial
preparers. To judge this proposal’s effectiveness, the IRS may wish to test its costs
and benefits in a manner similar to what the IRS did in evaluating the EITC pilot
certification program. See IRS EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC) INITIATIVE: FINAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 10-11 (explaining that in evaluating the
certification program, administrative data regarding tax return information was
collected and surveys shedding light on the burden imposed by the certification were
conducted to assess the process on compliance and participation).

